We provide new estimates of merger value creation by exploiting revealed preferences of merging banks within a matching market framework. We find that merger value arises from cost efficiencies in overlapping markets, relaxing of regulation, and network effects exhibited by the acquirer-target matching. In our analysis of bank mergers, we find that merger value creation is unrelated to acquirer misvaluation and performance, suggesting that mergers in our sample are not motivated by manager-specific rents. Consistent with this interpretation, we estimate that only six percent of mergers destroy value, reducing overall merger value by less than one percent.
Introduction
Understanding merger value creation is critically important for the shareholder value at stake, but also because how merger value is created has important implications for the nature of competition and consumer well-being (e.g., see Bernile and Lyandres, 2010) . The extent of merger value creation is also an important indication of the quality of corporate governance (e.g., see Harford et al., 2012) . Despite the pervasive use of merger value creation measures, the typical proxy for the value created in a merger, announcement stock returns for the acquirer, is only partly driven by how much value is fundamentally created because a merger announcement also induces investors to reevaluate the acquirer's stock in light of the decision to merge (Bhagat et al., 2005; Savor and Lu, 2009; Bayazitova et al., 2012) . Although recent work has sought better measurement of value creation, proposed adjustments to announcement returns still rely heavily on stock market responses, and thus, investor choices unrelated to merger value may still influence its measurement. An ideal measure for the value created by mergers should not depend on investor behavior that is unrelated to fundamental value creation. 1 In this spirit, we develop a novel approach to estimate merger value creation that does not depend on investor behavior because it relies on the choices of the merging firms directly. We use the structure of a two-sided matching market to identify outside options for each firm (e.g., see Becker, 1973; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) , and use characteristics of these outside options in comparison to the actual merger choices to estimate merger value creation.
Our measure of merger value creation produces an estimate for the value created for the merged entity, but we net out acquirer-to-target transfers to obtain an acquirer-specific measure of merger value. 2 Our approach avoids having to correct for investor revaluation because we directly estimate merger value creation in a structural model without relying on stock returns. In outlining a new method to estimate value creation in merger markets, our approach is complementary to recent work that has proposed revaluation corrections to announcement returns.
Although our insights extend to the merger market more broadly, we focus our empirical analysis on the bank merger market, employing comprehensive merger-level data from 1995 until 2005 in our study of the determinants of bank merger value. We focus on bank mergers because it is straightforward to define the scope of the matching market within a narrowly-defined industry such as banking. This is especially true during our sample time frame (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the decade following the elimination of cross-state branching restrictions (Riegle-Neal Inter-1 Using a method that is similar in spirit, Devos et al. (2009) use Value Line forecasts of cash flows to produce an estimate of merger value that is linked directly to the underlying fundamentals of the firm. By comparison to their method, our technique does not require analyst coverage, or any assumption about the validity of the forecasts. In place of an assumption that the forecasts are reliable, we maintain the assumption that each firm in the merger market reveals a consistent set of preferences by their choice of merger.
2 Both measures are useful in practice. The value of the merged entity, for example, speaks more directly to the synergies created when the two firms merge. The acquirer value arguably speaks more directly to corporate governance of the acquiring firm.
state Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 1994) . 3 We use this cross-state standardization of merger regulations to motivate our treatment of mergers in the U.S. banking industry as a national merger market that takes place each year.
In our empirical analysis, we recover a structural merger value function that accounts explicitly for the endogenous matching process, and thus, can be used for causal inference. We use our approach to study how features of the acquirer and the target institutions affect the value of the bank merger. According to industry sources, an important reason for banks to merge during our sample was to capitalize on economies of scale. As a 1998 article in the San Francisco Chronicle noted, "A bigger bank can acquire customers more cheaply by marketing on a national scale, and can reduce risk by diversifying geographically" (Marshall, 1998) . In a two-sided matching market, these factors suggest that large banks derive more value from larger target banks, which would generate a positive assortative match in bank size (Becker, 1973) . Our framework accounts for this cost advantage of large banks by including terms in the match value function that capture the interaction between the size of the acquirer and target banks.
Our main specification quantifies the effect on merger value of cost efficiencies of various types (e.g., merging to a more efficient scale and capturing economies of scope in nearby markets), as well as merger value derived from additional market power. Our structural approach accounts for these explanations by defining a merger value function that explicitly depends on market concentration and the overlap between acquirer and target markets. We also include measures of performance and valuation of the target and acquirer banks to evaluate how acquirer overvaluation (Jensen, 2004) or acquirer and target performance (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001) relate to value creation. In effect, this specification allows us to distinguish whether the merger value we recover arises from choices motivated by overvaluation of equity, or from synergies of different types. The revealed preference method allows the data and the pattern of mergers to speak directly to which of these explanations is consistent with merger decisions and merger value creation.
Throughout our empirical exercise, we find that the mergers we study were primarily motivated by efficiencies, cost reductions or reducing inefficiencies from previous regulations, and that market concentration (measured by a Herfindahl index) also contributes positively to the value of the merger. On the other hand, we find little evidence 3 The 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act effectively standardized the state-by-state deregulation in branching rules that had been taking place over the previous two decades. After the Riegle-Neal Act, the U.S. banking industry consolidated considerably, in large part due to the merger wave we study. Specifically, the total number of banking institutions in the United States declined from 10,416 to 7,582 in the decade following Riegle-Neal (FDIC Summary of Deposits, 1995 Deposits, -2005 . For a complete historical account of this deregulation process as well as a comprehensive empirical analysis of its determinants, see Kroszner and Strahan (1999) . that mergers were motivated by high (or low) performing target banks. Our evidence also suggests value creation is unrelated to the acquirer's pre-merger efficiency, loan loss reserves, or market overvaluation. Because our method recovers merger value creation from the perspective of the decision-maker, these null findings suggest that the mergers we study are not motivated by private benefits that tend to erode value through poor performance, or that tend to arise in firms whose equity is misvalued. 4 Consistent with an efficiency rationale for value creation, we find that merger value is greater when there is a greater overlap between acquirer and target markets, and that these gains are greater for mergers between banks regulated by the same agency before the merger. These effects likely represent efficiencies rather than market power because we also control for market concentration in the target's markets in these specifications. The magnitude of these efficiency effects on merger value are sensible, amounting to nearly the annual administrative cost of operating a single bank branch (Radecki et al., 1996) . These efficiencies may arise from the ability of the combined bank to pool fixed operating expenses such as advertising and ATM networks across the acquirer and target banks. 5 Our work also sheds light on the effects of banking deregulation by studying mergers in the post-Riegle-Neal banking industry. Early work on banking deregulation focused on how deregulation affects aggregate measures of economic activity such as state per capita income growth and its volatility (Strahan, 2003) . More recent work has turned to study deregulation's competitive effects on small-firm finance and innovation (Rice and Strahan, 2010; Cornaggia et al., 2013) . We deepen existing work on the outcomes of banking competition by studying the value of bank mergers at the merger level. When we aggregate to the entire banking industry, we estimate significant value generated from the increased merger activity during our post-Riegle-Neal sample, a new and novel quantitative indication that the prohibition of banking and branching across state lines was costly.
In addition, we also include other features of banking regulation in our specifications for the merger value function. In particular, we allow the merger value function to depend on whether the acquirer and target have different banking charters, and thus, report to different regulatory agencies before the merger. By including this information in the merger value function, we recover the implicit costs of diverse chartering regulations from the 4 Because we rely on the revealed preference of firms to construct our measure of value creation, our estimate of value creation captures private benefits to management as long as these benefits are correlated with factors included in our merger value function. To the extent that private benefits are greater when efficiency-enhancing factors are greater, this is an indication that the manager's decision-making is aligned well with shareholders. The pattern of results with respect to performance, overvaluation, overlap, and market power is consistent with this interpretation. 5 Viewed from the perspective of the banking literature, these findings provide an external check on previous work that evaluated market power versus branching efficiency motives for bank mergers using stock market evidence (Rhoades, 1994; Seims, 1996) . Notably, the existing literature documents a takeover premium for acquired firms as in the broader merger literature (Rhoades, 1994; Eckbo, 2009 ), mergers do not appear to lead to significant changes to market concentration, and that there appears to be an efficiency motive for mergers between banks with significant overlap in markets (Seims, 1996) . pattern of mergers. In this way, our results speak to the effects of inconsistent regulators, and are complementary to the evidence presented by Agarwal et al. (2012) . In a counterfactual exercise, we find that value generated by mergers would be 20 to 50 percent higher per year if all banks were of the same charter type. This result suggests that there are significant frictions in the bank merger market imposed by regulation. Once we rescale our estimates by the fraction of banks that merge in a typical year, our counterfactual-estimated cost of bank chartering regulation equals 1 to 2.5 percent of the value of the entire banking industry. This cost estimate reflects both implicit and explicit costs as revealed by choices of the merging firms, and is of the same magnitude as explicit annual supervisory costs (Whalen, 2010) .
Using the structural merger value function to estimate the value produced from each merger, we estimate an annual average of 6.02 percent of mergers destroy value in our sample, and these mergers destroy value amounting to less than one percent of merger value created for each year in our sample, a magnitude similar to recent work by Bayazitova et al. (2012) . When we net out transfers to consider acquirer-specific value, we obtain only a slightly larger annual average of 6.91 percent of mergers that destroy acquirer value. To assess whether a low frequency of value destroying mergers is somehow automatic in our framework, we compute the fraction of mergers that would destroy value if an acquirer matches with a random target. In this extreme case, mergers destroy value more often than not (62.16 percent annually). In comparison to the low frequencies of merger value creation that we document, this finding also highlights the value of making the correct merger choice, conditional on the decision to merge.
Our estimate of the extent of value-destroying mergers is conservative because some fraction of the realized negative merger values is likely due to sampling variability. We assess the role of sampling variability as an explanation for the observed value destroying mergers by computing an equilibrium of the matching model that assumes acquirers and targets reallocate optimally, given the structural merger value function we estimate. Specifically, we use the structural merger value function to compute the merger value from any possible acquirer-target pair, and use these merger values to calculate the implied optimal pattern of mergers. In this optimal reallocation of acquirers and targets, the fraction of acquirers that go unmatched represents value-destroying mergers that are not attributable to optimization error. This exercise allows us to recover the fraction of value-destroying acquirers, or acquirers that would generate negative merger value, even in the computed optimal pattern of mergers. Using this approach, our estimate of the frequency of value-destroying acquirers is 2.94 percent annually. The small magnitude of these estimates implies that the scope is quite small for value-destroying mergers that occur for reasons outside of factors explicitly modeled in our merger value function -notably, behavioral theories of merger value destruction, and unobserved agency frictions.
Because our approach uses the matching equilibrium explicitly in a structural model, the estimated match value function we obtain can be used to predict bank mergers, even after the policy environment changes. A structural approach like ours is particularly useful because matching market equilibria are sensitive to small perturbations in payoffs and changes in the policy environment. In these cases, structural estimates can be used to more reliably predict merger outcomes than analogous reduced form approaches. Indeed, the predictive strength of our structural method is borne out in the data. We compare the one-year-ahead predictive accuracy of our structural method to a reduced form predictive regression that uses a binary logit and the predictors that make up our match value function. We find that our revealed preference method dramatically outperforms standard predictive regressions, allowing us to more reliably predict mergers one year ahead than a binary logit approach. On this basis, our method represents a dramatic improvement over reduced form predictive regressions. 6 As our main findings demonstrate, our estimation of merger value creation and its determinants has a number of notable advantages. First, our revealed preference method does not make any assumption about the behavior of investors or timing of market information in order to quantify merger value creation. Second, because it does not rely on stock market data, our revealed preference method can be applied to mergers between two private entities when mergers and characteristics data for private-to-private mergers are available, expanding the potential scope of analysis and inference. 7 Third, the structural model of merger value creation facilitates a direct assessment of the degree of optimization error in the choice of merger targets, and a straightforward quantification of the fraction of value destroying mergers. Finally, our structural method allows for a more accurate forecast of merger activity than alternative methods to predict mergers.
Our approach relates to recent work by Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) who estimate merger valuations by explicitly modeling each merger as an independent auction using observed takeover bids. In contrast, our equilibriumbased approach implies that takeover bids are not independent, but are linked across targets because each acquirer in the same merger market can bid on the same set of targets. We infer merger value by the choices forgone by successful bidders, and as a result, our method does not require observation of successful and unsuccessful bids by 6 Although our method requires relatively few assumptions, a notable assumption we employ to apply our model to the bank mergers setting is that the bank merger market is national immediately after the Riegle-Neal Act passed. This assumption is not literally true because some states lagged in their official adoption of the law's provisions (see Johnson and Rice, 2008) . We address this concern about the validity of our assumption and robustness of our method by estimating the match value function in each year of the sample. We the predictive accuracy of our structural method outperforms the baseline binary logit predictive accuracy in every year of our sample (even in earlier years), suggesting that to the extent the assumption is violated, the advantages of our structural method outweigh the costs. 7 Other authors have expressed interest in relaxing the dependence of merger value creation measures on stock market data. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) suggest an alternative method for evaluating the value of mergers that does not rely on stock market information, by using productivity measures. More recently, Devos et al. (2009) produced estimates of merger synergies from Value Line forecasts, which depend more directly on fundamental value creation. Our method shares the advantage of these methods without requiring a reliable measurement of productivity or coverage by Value Line.
acquirers. This is an attractive feature of our setting when high bids by strong potential acquirers discourage bidding from potential acquirers with slightly lower valuations, or when few formal bids are solicited from strongest potential acquirers.
Our work also relates to a growing literature in industrial organization that employs revealed preference methods (e.g., Aguirregabiria et al., 2012) . Notably, Chen and Song (2013) apply the Fox (2010a) estimator to the matching between banks and firms, and find evidence of a positive assortative match between banks and firms.
To the extent that firms' linkages with target banks are persistent, we should expect that these characteristics of bank-firm matching would be relevant to acquirer-target bank matching, which is our focus. Indeed, that larger targets likely have larger firms as clients is one reason to expect that acquirer and target banks mergers will also exhibit the positive assortative match we document here.
More generally, our paper contributes to an increasingly-important segment of the empirical finance literature that explicitly addresses endogeneity in financial markets research (Roberts and Whited, 2012) . In the last decade, structural approaches have yielded new insight into a wide variety of topics in finance, including debt dynamics, corporate cash holdings, and the role of venture capital firms (Sorensen, 2007; Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Boileau and Moyen, 2009 ). Relative to existing structural work in finance, our paper employs relatively few assumptions to recover a structural value function. As a result, our method is conceptually straightfoward, and similar methods to ours should find fruitful application to address important questions in financial economics.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents our revealed preference method, and uses Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the estimator's small sample properties. Section 2 describes the data and basic summary statistics. Section 3 motivates and describes the form of our specifications. Section 4 is a discussion of the main results on value creation and the determinants of value creation. Section 5 discusses in-sample and out-of-sample performance, compares to relevant alternatives, and presents a counterfactual simulation. Section 6 concludes.
The Revealed Preference Model
When analyzing merger value, it is instructive to observe that each acquirer deliberates among a number of viable alternative targets, and each target considers viable offers from a number of alternative acquirers. In practice, targets often entertain multiple takeover bids at the same time (e.g., see Bhagat et al., 2005) , but these offers need not be explicit to matter for the merger market decisions of targets and acquirers. Through this equilibrium channel, the values of feasible alternative matches -both implicit and explicit offers -provide a lower bound for the value of each realized merger. Our revealed preference approach formalizes this intuition by explicitly using the characteristics of each bank's alternative matches together with the observed acquirer-target transfers to estimate the value of the mergers that do occur.
In our model of bank mergers as a two-sided matching game (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) , the merged acquirertarget pair realizes a joint match value, which is split using an equilibrium transfer from the acquirer to the target.
Each bank matches with the bank on the other side of the market that maximizes its individual payoff. In equilibrium, matched banks receive a higher payoff from the observed match partners than they could get from counterfactual partners.
In the model, we construct many possible counterfactual matches to each observed match within a matching market, yielding many inequalities in the structural match value for each observed match. Given these inequalities and a parametric form for the match value function, we choose the parameter vector that maximizes the fraction of inequalities that hold. This is the maximum score estimator, which Fox (2010a) proved to be consistent for matching games given a rank order condition (as in Manski (1975; 1985) ). 8 Building on Fox(2007; 2010a; 2010b), 9 we develop a maximum score estimator that incorporates acquirer-target transfer data. Transfer data allow the maximum score estimator to produce estimates on an interpretable scale, which is advantageous for understanding the determinants of merger value creation. 10
Matching Model
For a total number of M y matches in matching market y, we denote acquirers by b = 1, ..., M y and targets by t = 1, ..., M y . We assume there is one national merger market per year and markets in different years are independent of one another. The merged pair (b,t) realizes a post-merger value f (b,t), which is the summation of the individual payoffs to the acquirer and target,
The payoff to the acquirer V b (b,t) is the post-merger value minus the acquisition price p bt paid to the target, 8 Fox (2010a) made separate consistency arguments for one large matching market and many independent matching markets. In the U.S. bank mergers setting for our sample time frame, we have 11 distinct matching markets, one for each year. We view each annual matching market as a large matching market in the sense of Fox (2010a)'s one matching market asymptotic result, and the fact that we observe mergers for multiple years allows us to estimate the match value function with even greater precision. Nevertheless, our year-by-year results rely more explicitly on the assumption of a large matching market that meets each year. 9 The maximum score estimator proposed by Fox (2007) does not use data on transfers. The fact that the estimator works when transfer data are not available is an advantage if no data on transfers are available, which is true in many matching contexts. 10 In addition, we demonstrate that for parameters that are identified using the without-transfers estimator of Fox (2010a) , our estimator is more precise. We also demonstrate that our method identifies parameters that cannot be identified without transfer data, e.g., the sensitivity of the match value function to a change in some characteristic of the target bank.
f (b,t) − p bt . The target's payoff V t (b,t) equals the acquisition price p bt . Each acquirer b maximizes V b (b,t) across targets. Each target t maximizes V t (b,t) across acquirers. In the matching equilibrium, every bank derives higher value from the observed acquirer-target match than from any counterfactual match. This revealed-preference insight gives inequalities that we use in our estimation. For example, if acquirer b is matched with target t while target t could have been acquired by acquirer b, we infer that b derives more value from being matched with t than with t , which gives the condition:
The transfer from acquirer b to target t p bt is not available from data on observed matches, but in equilibrium, each target t receives an offer that is the same across acquirers. For acquirer b to acquire target t, the offer p bt from acquirer b must be weakly greater than the offer p b t from a competing acquirer b . Acquirer b's equilibrium offer will not be strictly greater than the alternative because higher offer prices reduce acquirer b's payoff. Hence, p bt = p b t and the inequality in (1). The same logic applies to acquirer b , yielding the inequalities:
The inequalities have a natural interpretation. For example, (2) means that the extra value that acquirer b derives acquiring target t rather than target t exceeds the extra expense of acquiring target t rather than target t . Equations (2) and (3) are useful if we have data on transfer amounts, but these data are often unavailable. In the absence of transfer data, we can add these inequalities to obtain a single inequality that does not rely on data from transfers:
This inequality implies that the total value from any two observed matches exceeds the total value from two counterfactual matches constructed by exchanging partners.
Estimation of the Matching Model
Let ε bt be a match-specific error that affects the value to acquirer b matching with target t. Then, acquirers and targets match to one another according to the match value function F (b,t) = f (b,t)+ε bt . As each acquirer can only acquire one target, the acquirer's choice among targets is a discrete choice. As a simple semiparametric technique to estimate this discrete choice, we turn to maximum score estimation. 11 Fox (2010a) developed a maximum score estimator that makes use of inequality (4). Specifically, given a parametric form for the match value function f (b,t|β ), one can estimate the parameter vector β by maximizing:
over the parameter space for β . For a given value of the parameter vectorβ , Q β is the number of times the inequality (4) is satisfied. The maximum score estimatorβ , therefore, maximizes the number of times that this inequality holds among the set of inequalities considered. 12 Although attractive in its simplicity, the maximum score estimator based on (4) does not make use of transfer data, which may significantly improve the performance of the estimator. Moreover, acquirer-specific or targetspecific attributes cancel out when we adding the inequalities (2) and (3) together to obtain (4). Therefore, any parameters that measure the sensitivity of the match value function acquirer-or target-specific attributes cannot be identified with maximum score estimation based solely on without-transfers information.
Both to improve the precision of the estimator and to identify the effect of acquirer-specific and target-specific attributes, we develop two related estimators that use transfer data, which we call the with-transfer estimator 1 (WT1) and with-transfer estimator 2 (WT2). We call the maximum score estimator based on equation (4) the no-transfer-data (NTD) estimator.
For the same pairwise comparisons used to form the objective function for the NTD estimator, the WT1 estima- 11 If we assume that the match-specific errors ε bt are distributed iid Type 1 extreme value, the model reduces to the familiar multinomial logit model. A significant weakness to the multinomial logit approach is that imposes a restrictive set of substitution patterns, for example, the red-bus blue-bus problem (McFadden, 1974; Debreu, 1960 ). An acquirer should be more likely to substitute between similar targets, yet the multinomial logit model does not easily allow for this type of substitution. We explicitly contrast the performance of the multinomial logit to our maximum score technique in Appendix (A.2). The appendix also considers another alternative, one-sided matching. In both cases, our two-sided matching method that uses maximum score estimation is preferable. 12 Fox demonstrates that one need not consider all possible inequalities to obtain a consistent estimator, but merely form a large subset of all possible inequalities. Fox (2010a) shows that the maximum score estimatorβ is consistent if the model satisfies a rank order property (as in Manksi (1975; 1985) ) for matching games -i.e., the inequality in equation (4) implies P [b acquires t and b acquires t ] ≥ P [b acquires t and b acquires t]. In addition to providing intuition for conditions under which the maximum score estimator should be used, this strong version of the rank order property is used in the identification arguments given by Fox (2010b). tor imposes the inequalities (2) and (3) simultaneously. If both (2) and (3) hold, (4) holds as well, but the converse is not true. The WT1 estimator maximizes the objective function:
An alternative approach to incorporating transfer information is to use inequalities (2) and (3) separately when forming the objective function. This WT2 estimator maximizes the objective function:
In the appendix, we perform a series of Monte Carlo exercises to evaluate the properties of the with-transfers estimator (WT1), finding that our with-transfers estimator performs well relative to a number of notable alternatives. 13 Relative to the without-transfers estimator of Fox (2007), we confirm two main advantages: (1) transfers data allow for much greater precision in estimating determinants of merger value creation, and (2) the with-transfers estimator can identify parameters that are otherwise unidentified without data on transfers -namely, target-specific and acquirer-specific determinants of merger value creation.
Description of Data

Merger-Deal Data
We study the matching market for banks using comprehensive bank merger and attribute data from SNL Financial.
The data span all bank mergers in the United States between 1995 and 2005 and provide information about acquirer and target banks at the merger-deal level. For the date at which the acquisition is announced, the data provide the asset holdings (A b and A t ) and number of branches (B b and B t ) for both acquirer and target bank. We also observe the market value of the transfer (p bt ) from the acquirer bank to the target bank upon merging. SNL Financial's database also provides data on several performance measures of acquirer and target banks.
These performance measures are the efficiency ratio (non-interest expense / (net interest income + other income)), the loan loss reserve coverage ratio (loan loss reserves / nonperforming loans), and price to book ratio (stock price/ book value) of acquirer. 14 As the information on these performance measures is not available for every merger deal in our sample, we employ these measures in auxiliary specifications that serve to check the robustness of our main findings, and also to speak directly to managerial motives to merge. In addition, we also construct a measure of deal value at the merger-deal level to use as the equilibrium transfer p bt in our with-transfers estimator. 15 Figure 1 portrays the distribution of deal values in our sample in a density plot of logged deal values. From the figure, the distribution of logged deal values is well-behaved and symmetric.
Bank and Branch Attribute Data
The while the average number of branches per bank increased from 7.81 to 12.50. The consolidation is not merely taking place among a few large banks, as is indicated by trimmed mean of branches per bank, which has increased by nearly 50 percent over this period.
The Summary of Deposits Database also provides information on the regulatory agency responsible for overseeing each bank, which depends on the bank's charter. Banks can adopt either a national charter or a state charter.
If the bank has a national charter, it is regulated federally 16 and it must become a member of the Federal Reserve, which adds an additional layer of audits in exchange for the liquidity provided by being a member of the Federal Reserve system. Additionally, the FDIC serves as a back-up regulator to all banks with national charters. If the bank has a state charter, the state regulatory agency is responsible for audits and the FDIC is the primary federal regulatory. 17 A number of mergers in our sample took place between acquirer and target banks with different charter types. To empirically assess the importance of this regulatory friction, we construct an indicator variable 14 The data also contain the price to book ratio (stock price/ book value) of target bank at the time of merger as long as the bank is a publicly traded company. Restricting the sample of mergers to those where the target is publicly traded leaves too few observations to obtain reliable estimates. 15 We measure deal value as aggregate price paid for the equity of the Entity Sold in the transaction, as of the event in question. Where available, Deal Value is calculated as the number of fully diluted shares outstanding, less the number of shares excluded from the transaction, multiplied by the deal value per share, less the number of "in the money" options/warrants/stock appreciation rights times the weighted average strike price of the options/warrants/stock appreciation rights. Deal Value excludes debt assumed and employee retention pools. 16 Depending on the type of institution during our sample time frame, one of two federal regulatory agencies may be responsible for regulating a bank with a national charter: the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), which regulates savings banks and savings and loans associations; The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which regulates national banks.
17 State-chartered banks can also become members of the Federal Reserve system, but in practice, most state-chartered banks do not. This suggests that there is a tradeoff between the benefits provided by the Federal Reserve and the auditing requirements.
samecharter bt , which equals one if the acquirer and target have the same type of charter.
At the MSA level, we construct the market share of each banking institution using its fraction of total deposit holdings in the MSA. Using these market shares, we calculate this MSA-level Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) before and after each merger, which allows us to assess whether a merger meets the criteria for additional scrutiny under the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines (HHI > 1800 and ∆HHI > 200). 18 Using this information, we construct a merger-deal level covariate HHIviolate bt , which equals the fraction of target t MSAs for which a merger with acquirer b would lead to Antitrust scrutiny under the Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines.
Finally, for acquirer and target branches within MSAs, the FDIC geography identifiers allow us to construct a merger-deal level covariate overlap bt , which equals the fraction of overlapping MSA markets for the acquirer and target banks. We construct this variable for each potential merger and estimate its contribution to the match value function.
Estimation
Determinants of Match Value
During our sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , bank mergers were potentially motivated by some combination of efficiencies, 19 merging to acquire and exploit market power, 20 and acquiring better performing branches to improve the bank's overall performance. 21 Together with our data on institution size and performance (see Section 2.1 for details on performance measures), we estimate how efficiencies and market power separately affect the bank merger match value function. A number of these determinants of bank merger value are target-or acquirer-specific. Thus, the ability of the with-transfers estimator to identify acquirer-specific and target-specific determinants of merger value is important.
After the 1994 Riegle-Neal Act, mergers were often motivated by creating national banking networks that are 18 We compute each MSA's HHI by taking the sum of squared market shares. 19 Using data from the pre-Riegle-Neal era, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) demonstrate that new banking technologies for both deposittaking and lending increased the geographic scale of banking. Our sample time frame (1995 -2005) occurs during a period of rapid innovation in Internet technology, which increases the efficient scale of banking beyond the ATM and credit history technologies described by Kroszner and Strahan (1999) . Thus, economies of scale are as relevant for bank mergers in our time period as they were for the geographic scale of banking in Kroszner and Strahan (1999) . 20 At the time of our sample, industry experts pointed to efficiencies (or reductions in inefficiencies) from cross-state mergers, and deemphasized the role of market power as a motivator for merging (Marshall, 1998) . Nevertheless, we consider this hypothesis by including market power terms in the match value function.
21 In a 1998 newsletter to the Federalist Society (Financial Services & E-Commerce Newsletter -Volume 2, Issue 2, Summer 1998), James Rockett makes the point that the purported merger mania after the Riegle-Neal Act was -in part -motivated by achieving better stock market performance and improving balance sheets. To the extent that our measures of financial performance of targets and acquirers, we can assess whether these were primary motivators. less sensitive to local economic shocks, and more valuable to consumers. To this end, there are obvious advantages to banking with a bank with a wider geographic footprint, as Anil Kashyap noted in 1998, "If you are a BofA customer, you won't have to pay transaction fees at ATM machines since there'll be one in every city you go to" (Marshall, 1998) . As an alternative to opening new branches, mergers are an effective way for a bank to achieve a large, national banking network. We account for this large-banking-network motivation to merge by including interactions between target and acquirer banking attributes (assets and branches) in our specification of the match value function.
A merger between two banking institutions will also generate cost efficiencies (or inefficiencies) unrelated to the size of the network of branches. If economies of scale are easier to capture in banking markets familiar to the acquiring bank, the match value between an acquirer bank and a target bank will tend to increase with the fraction of overlapping markets (captured by overlap bt ). On the other hand, Aguirregabiria et al. (2012) document significant potential to diversify geographic risk post-Riegle-Neal by expanding into new markets. Thus, the effect of overlap on bank merger value will tend to be negative to the extent geographic diversification of risk is an important motive for bank mergers. Thus, the ex ante relationship between overlap bt and match value is an empirical question that speaks to whether geographic risk or economizing on local efficiencies is more important.
To address the extent to which the degree of market concentration increases merger match value, we include the average Herfindahl-Hischman Index (HHI) of the target bank's markets as a component of our match value function. Moreover, to the degree that antitrust regulation tempers this incentive to merge, we also include the fraction of target markets that would warrant antitrust scrutiny (HHIViolate bt ) in our match value specifications.
In the middle of this merger wave, however, industry experts did not consider market power to be an important explanation for the large number of mergers during our sample period. 22 Nevertheless, including these terms in the match value function allows us to assess the market concentration hypothesis directly.
Functional Form for the Match Value Function
To use the maximum-score estimator, we specify a parametric form for the value of a match between target t and acquirer b. 23 For the match-value function, we follow existing empirical work on matching markets (e.g., Fox 2007 and Chen and Song 2013) , and evaluate the degree and direction of assortative matching using interactions between 22 "Most experts believe a merger between two huge banks operating in different parts of the country -such as NationsBank and BofAis unlikely to harm consumers by reducing competition, unlike a consolidation of banks in one local market" (Marshall, 1998) . 23 As different specifications for this functional form focus on different features of the matching between acquirer and target, we evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to several related specifications for the match value function in the maximum-score estimation in Appendix A.
acquirer and target attributes. Exploiting the ability of our estimator to identify non-interacted parameters, we also extend the specification to include target-specific and acquirer-specific attributes:
where W b is an attribute of acquirer b and W t is the same attribute for target t, X b and X t are acquirer-specific and target-specific covariates, X bt is a vector of match-specific covariates and ε bt is an unobserved match-specific error term that we assume is independent across matches in our data set. We estimate several variations on this basic specification, adding to the match function in (8) interaction terms for additional attributes. Using the transfers data with our with-transfers estimator allows us to identify γ 1 and γ 2 , which are unidentified in the without-transfers estimator.
Subsampling Confidence Intervals
We generate point estimates by running the differential evolution optimization routine from 20 different starting points and selecting the coefficient vector that yields the highest value for the maximum score objective function. 24 For valid inference, we generate the confidence intervals using the subsampling procedure described by Politis and Romano (1992) and Delgado et al. (2001) to approximate the sampling distribution. For the entire data set, we set the subsample size to be 500 -approximately 1/3 to 1/4 of the total sample size. Of all samples of size n s = 500 drawn from the original data set (N observations), we select at random 100 of these samples for use in constructing the confidence bounds.
For each of the S = 100 subsamples, we compute the parameter vector that maximizes the objective function in (6). Call the estimate from the s th subsampleβ s and the estimate from the original full sampleβ f ull . The approximate sampling distribution for our parameter vector can be computed by calculatingβ s = n s N 1 3 β s −β f ull +β f ull for each subsample. This procedure accounts for the 3 √ N convergence of the maximum score estimator (Politis and Romano, 1992; Delgado et al., 2001 ). We take the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile of this empirical sampling distribution to compute 95 percent confidence intervals for all of our estimates.
Main Findings 4.1 Evidence on the Determinants of Merger Value Creation
This section presents a number of alternative specifications of the match value function in order to better understand the determinants of value creation in the merger market. The most robust determinants of merger value creation are lower regulatory frictions, cost efficiencies from overlapping markets, and network effects exemplified in the assortative matching between acquirers and targets.
4.1.1 Bank Size, Market Concentration, and Overlap of Markets Table 2 presents results from estimating the revealed preference model with merger value function given by equation (8). In every specification in Table 2 , the coefficient estimates on the interactions between acquirer and target assets (branches) are positive and statistically significant. 25 This finding suggests that large acquirer banks tend to match with larger target banks, and that this pattern of matching is revealed to be valuable by the pattern of potential mergers that did not occur. For example, the estimate on the interactive term in column (2) implies that a 10 percent increase in the number of acquirer branches is associated with a $408,000 increase in the effect of an additional target branch on merger match value. This interactive effect remains significant whether or not the match value function includes target assets and the interactive term between acquirer and target assets. Although the magnitudes vary across specifications, the interpretation in the context of the observed match is that the matching equilibrium exhibits a strong positive assortative match on both branches and assets, a finding that is consistent with the conventional understanding that mergers during this time period (1995 to 2005) were motivated by taking advantage of large national networks.
Across specifications in Table 2 , the estimates for the own effect of target assets and branches is negative across specifications, and these own effects tend to be statistically significant. This finding together with the consistently significant interactive effects suggests that a larger number of assets and branches in the target bank contributes positively to the match value, but not independently of the size of the acquirer bank. Taken together, one interpretation of these estimates is that a network of branches and customers is more valuable on average as the size of the network grows, suggesting that an acquirer with many branches and customers would derive disproportionately more value from a large target, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, there is a cost to managing more assets and branches. This cost shows up in the coefficient estimates on target attributes, which are consistently negative and statistically significant.
In the final two columns of Table 2 , the positive and significant estimates for overlap bt suggest that banks derive significantly more match value if the acquirer and target have more overlapping markets. Relative to having no overlap in MSA markets, the estimate in column (4) implies that an acquirer and target with complete overlap in MSA markets will realize a nearly $1 million ($967,440) increase in the merger match value. Because our specifications account for market concentration, this finding suggests that the merging banks can realize operating efficiencies better when the target and acquirer banks have branches in the same MSA. The magnitude of this estimate is sensible given previous estimates to operate a bank branch. In a different context, Radecki et al. (1996) estimate that the total costs of operating a branch are around $1.4 million annually with indirect costs (e.g., advertising, and computing systems) amounting to half of that. Given this estimate holds constant the number of branches as another predictor in the match value function, these efficiencies more likely represent cost savings on indirect costs like advertising that can be spread across multiple branches than cost savings from branch closures.
To the role of market concentration, the positive estimate on target bank's average HHI suggests that greater market concentration increases the match value, consistent with greater market concentration allowing the combined bank to extract additional profit. On the other hand, having a higher fraction of MSA-level markets that would justify antitrust scrutiny (i.e., greater HHI Violation Fraction) does not seem to either detract from the match value nor add to it. As column (5) demonstrates, this finding on insensitivity of the match value function to the HHI violation fraction is robust to controlling for the target bank's average HHI. Taken together with the results on assortative match and overlapping markets, the results from these specifications indicate that both efficiency and market power rationales to merge create value for the merger.
The Role of Pre-Merger Bank Performance and Acquirer Valuation
We also allow the match value function to depend on performance measures of acquirers and targets: the efficiency ratio (noninterest expense/ income) for both acquirer and target, the loan loss reserve coverage ratio (loan loss reserves/ nonperforming loans) for both acquirer and target, and the price to book ratio for the acquirer. 26 We include these performance measures to assess the importance of efficiency, distress, and acquirer valuation in merger value creation.
Given existing work on agency and merger activity, this is a natural line of inquiry. Although merger value could depend on operational performance for efficiency reasons (e.g., see Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) ), acquirer performance characteristics may also proxy for agency frictions, and thus be related to merger value creation through that channel. In addition, motivated by work on agency and value-destroying mergers (e.g., Harford et al. 2012) , another natural prediction is that acquirer banks with a greater price to book ratio will be more likely to engage in value-destroying mergers. A conclusion of this sort is obtained by Bayazitova et al. (2012) , but the role of overvalued equity in leading to value-destroying activities is familiar in the broader literature as well (e.g., see
Jensen 2004).
In Table 3 , we report specifications for merger value that include these measures of performance, and across specifications, there does not seem to be much of a relationship between merger value and either target performance or acquirer performance. Nonetheless, the qualitative findings of Section 4.1.1 remain true. In particular, there appears to be an assortative match, and the overlap between acquirer and target markets is an important indicator of merger value creation. These matching and branching efficiency motives to merge appear to be robust, while performance measures do not appear to systematically affect merger value.
We rationalize this null finding by observing that our measure of merger value creation is unaffected by investor motives, while previous work on this question has used merger announcement returns. Using merger announcement returns can be especially problematic in evaluating the role of acquirer overvaluation in merger value creation because any revaluation by investors of an overvalued acquirer will tend to lead the acquirer's stock price to decline, and thus, be taken as an indication of merger value destruction. Because our measure is not affected by overvaluation of the acquirer except through fundamental value creation, we view our approach as being particularly advantageous in evaluating this effect. Thus, we conclude that the consolidation of banking institutions strongly reflects the relaxation of regulation and efficiency motives.
The Role of Bank Regulation
We now use our model to quantify the implicit costs of bank chartering through frictions in the bank merger market.
To evaluate these implicit costs, we allow the merger value function to depend on a dummy variable samecharter bt that equals one if the acquirer and target have the same type of charter, and thus, are regulated by the same regulator.
We also include an interaction between samecharter bt and overlap bt . can contribute to the value of the merger by avoiding these regulatory frictions, especially as a bank has branches in more markets, and thus, greater overlap with potential targets.
Year-by-Year Results
Although the revealed preference method makes relatively few assumptions, we make a notable simplifying assumption to adapt the estimator to the bank mergers setting; we assume the bank merger market becomes national immediately following the Riegle-Neal Act. In reality, the act was implemented on a staggered basis at the state level after the immediate passage of the act, and thus, the bank merger market was not completely national until around 2000 (Johnson and Rice, 2008) . The scope of the merger market is important for the revealed preference estimator because it defines which mergers comprise the set of outside options to the realized set of mergers. If some of these were not feasible because of delayed adoption of the law, it could affect the estimates.
To evaluate this concern, we estimate the merger value function separately for each year in our sample, and examine the time series of the effects we estimate. For this exercise, we estimate two specifications for the merger value function: (1) the specification in Table 2 with overlap and market concentration regulation variables, and (2) the specification in Table 4 with chartering information included. For both specifications, we present in Figure 2 the time series plots of the estimated coefficients for log (Assets b ) × Assets t , overlap bt , and samecharter bt × overlap bt .
Although there is time series variation in these estimates, the effects we estimate are remarkably consistent in sign and estimated magnitude.
We summarize the year-by-year estimates' persistence and sign in Table 5 , which computes the time-series mean for each coefficient estimate, as well as the standard error of the time series mean. 27 The estimates are of similar magnitude and signficance as the main specifications. As in earlier specifications, Table 5 highlights three robust features of our setting: (i) a positive assortative match on bank size as measured by assets, (ii) a significant positive effect of having overlapping markets on merger value creation, and (iii) an important role of regulation, especially in taking advantage of the value of having overlapping markets.
Evidence on Merger Value Creation
The fitted values from our merger value function provide merger-specific estimates for merger value creation from the perspective of the merging banks. As we demonstrated in Section 4.1.2, the estimated merger value function is not sensitive to measures of pre-merger performance or acquirer valuation, factors that should reflect managerspecific preferences to merge (Jensen, 2004) . Thus, we take our estimated merger value function to reflect underlying shareholder value. Further, we consider two notions of merger value: (a) value creation for the merged entity, which our fitted values measure directly, and (b) value creation for the acquirer, which we obtain by subtracting the acquirer-target transfer.
Value Creation for the Merged Entity
From the standpoint of our estimated merger value function, we can use the fitted values from the specification in column (5) of Table 2 to quantify the degree to which unmeasured agency frictions can destroy shareholder value. Table 6 presents summary statistics on the fraction of mergers that we compute to have negative merger value. As this table indicates, the scope for value-destroying mergers is quite small. On average, only 6.02 percent of mergers in a given year yield negative match value, and in every year of the sample, the lost value from these mergers is less than one percent of overall merger value creation.
These estimates quantify the scope for value-reducing agency problems in the merger market. For example, if we observe a merger that appears to reduce value according to cost efficiencies, market power, or networkenhancing benefits, it would be straightforward to conclude that the merger reduces shareholder value, which may indicate a manager-shareholder agency problem (e.g., see Harford et al. (2012) ). On the other hand, our specification for merger value creation may not capture some types of merger-specific synergies. To the extent these 27 Although our annual regressions are not OLS, this is an approach very similar to Fama and MacBeth (1973) , which is an approach that assumes that the sampling error in the coefficient estimates is independently distributed across years.
synergies are unmeasured and enhance the profitability of mergers that look unprofitable according to our measures, our revealed preference method will classify some of these mergers as negative value when they create value for unmeasured reasons. Because the set of mergers that appear to reduce value according to our specifications could be of either of these types, we hold that our estimate of the extent of value-destroying mergers is conservatively high.
Our matching model allows us to decompose value destroying mergers into two types: (a) mergers that destroy value when an acquirer had a positive value target available, and (b) mergers by acquirers that would destroy value regardless of the target. To conduct this decomposition, we estimate the match value function using (8), and compute the structural match value for each acquirer-target pair, both for actual matches and for acquirertarget pairs that did not merge with one another, but with another bank in the same year. Using these structural merger values, we solve the linear programming problem in equation (9) for the equilibrium one-to-one match, the equilibrium transfer amounts, and the match value produced in equilibrium. If an acquirer goes unmatched in the solution to the linear programming problem, none of the remaining feasible targets would generate positive match value, and thus, the acquirer would partake in a value-destroying merger regardless of the target.
As is indicated in Table 6 , this fraction of value destroying acquirers ranges from 1.81 percent (1998) to 4.17 percent (1995), with a cross-year average of 2.94 percent. This estimate indicates a small scope for value-destroying acquirers, on an order of magnitude that is consistent with recent findings by Bayazitova et al. (2012) . We now turn to developing a number of in-sample and out-of-sample assessments of the performance of our estimates.
Value Creation for the Acquirer
When we generate estimated acquirer-specific merger values by subtracting the transfer amount (essentially applying equation (1)), we speak more directly to the merger as a corporate decision made by the acquirer. Because the only difference between acquirer-specific merger value and our principal measure is the transfer amount, this decomposition allows us to evaluate whether accounting for the possibility of an overpayment by the acquirer would lead to much higher frequencies of value destroying mergers.
The Observed Mergers columns of Table 7 present estimates of the fraction of mergers that destroy acquirer value and the overall acquirer value generated from these mergers. In comparison to the same estimates for the merged entity, the fraction of mergers that destroy acquirer value is remarkably similar to the fraction of mergers that destroy value to the merged entity. The annual average across years for the fraction of value destroying mergers is 6.91 percent. That is, overpayment by the acquirer can rationalize an additional 0.89 percent of mergers that destroy value beyond what we observed in Table 6 .
To evaluate whether the value creation measures we construct automatically lead to value creation, we consider a counterfactual exercise in which acquirers randomly merge with targets in the same matching market. The Random Mergers columns of Table 7 present the results from this counterfactual exercise. As the table indicates, random mergers destroy value more frequently than not, and often generate negative acquirer value in aggregate.
The fact that this is not true in the observed sample of mergers indicates that there is great value for acquirers to choose sensible targets, which our method uncovers.
Robustness and Extensions
In-Sample Performance of Merger Value Function
Our framework allows us to compute a number of measures that allow us to evaluate the in-sample performance of the revealed preference method. To evaluate our revealed preference model, we benchmark against the optimal computed match as we did in evaluating the extent of merger value creation in the bank merger sample. We compute five measures of fit for our merger value function: (i) the fraction of mergers for which the realized match has the highest computed match value (Highest Value), (ii) the fraction of mergers for which the realized match is the same as the optimal pattern of mergers (Same Match), (iii) the average percentile rank of the observed matched target in the rank-order list of acquirers (Avg. Rank), (iv) the correlation coefficient between the actual deal values and the equilibrium transfers computed from the linear programming problem in (9) (Price ρ), (v) the fraction of realized merger value relative to the merger value created in the solution to the linear programming problem in (9) (% of Optimal Value). Greater values for each of these measures implies better performance of the estimated merger value function in sample.
For each year in our sample, Table 8 summarizes these measures of performance. Same Match ranges from 0.118 to 0.355, but it is relatively stable across years with an average of 0.261. Contrast Same Match with the Highest Value (a naive measure of fit), which ranges from 0.03 to 0.27 during our sample time frame, and averages 0.13. The Highest Value fraction is lower for in-sample predictions because some targets would generate the highest value for multiple acquirers, but this is not possible in equilibrium. Our equilibrium measure of fit (Same Match) accounts for this, and as a result, the model correctly predicts observed matches where the acquirer-target match does not generate the highest value for the acquirer (but where that acquirer's highest value target is assigned to another acquirer who values the target more highly), as is indicated by the greater success rate of Same Match.
Using average rank in the acquirer's rank order list, we observe a measured Avg. Rank ranging from 0.70 to 0.84 across years, with an average of 0.79 . Thus, when the estimated match value is not precisely at the top for the observed match, it is very often near the top of match values. By this measure, the fit of the model appears to be quite good. The advantage of an out-of-equilibrium measure of fit like Avg. Rank is that it is easy to compute, but their disadvantage is that it does not account for the effect of small perturbations in value on the matching market equilibrium.
Given the closer link to the underlying equilibrium of Same Match, one way to evaluate the relative validity of these out-of-equilibrium measures of fit is to compute their correlation across years with Same Match. The correlation between the Highest Value and Same Match is only 0.209 while the correlation between Avg. Rank and Same Match is greater at 0.396 . On this basis, we may prefer Avg. Rank to Highest Value for in-sample measures of it.
In our fourth assessment of the performance of the estimates from the revealed preference model, we compute the correlation between the actual transfer amounts to the equilibrium transfer prices from the dual of the linear programming problem. Regardless of the year considered, the high correlation between actual transfer amounts and the transfers from the linear programming problem, ranging from 0.715 to 0.996 indicates that our model replicate the transfer amounts quite well.
Finally, we contrast the observed set of mergers with this computed optimal pattern of mergers by computing the total match value under the observed equilibrium and compare it to the total match value in the solution to the linear programming problem. The implied value of mergers for the observed matching is meaningful, ranging from From this standpoint, the merger value function we estimate fits quite well.
Comparison to Binary Logit Regression
Another way to assess our revealed preference method is to compare its predictive accuracy to the performance of a binary logit regression that uses the same set of regressors. To implement the binary logit regression, we need to construct a data set of counterfactual and observed mergers with all of the information we used in our revealed preference model. On this data set, we use binary logistic regression to predict whether an acquirer-target pair was an observed merger using the features of our match value specification as the right hand side of the logistic regression.
We use the fitted values from the logistic regression to predict which target the acquirer will acquire. For each acquirer, the target with the largest fitted value is predicted to merge with the acquirer. Using this rule, we find that logistic regression performs dramatically worse than our revealed preference method. As the fraction of successful predictions in Table 9 indicate, binary logistic regression successfully predicts slightly greater than one percent of observed mergers, as compared to a yearly average of 26 percent using our reduced form method (see Table 8 ).
We attribute the significantly-better performance of our method to the fact that we explicitly take into account the nature of equilibrium in the bank merger market. Not only does this provide our method with an improved ability to relate our estimates to economic theory, the comparison to predictive logistic regression suggests that we achieve significant gains in predictive accuracy.
Out-of-Sample Fit and Predicting Mergers
A notable extension of our framework is to estimate a merger value function and use it predict mergers that will subsequently take place. The year-by-year estimates suggest that we could estimate the merger value function using observed and counterfactual mergers from year T − 1, then roll forward our estimated merger value function to date T to predict the mergers that are most likely to take place.
With an estimated match value function, we can evaluate the match value for realized mergers as well as for counterfactual mergers (a hypothetical merger between the acquirer and another target). To evaluate the ability of the model to predict mergers, we estimate the match value using the estimates from the previous year, and then assess the model fit using the measures of fit we discussed in the previous section. Table 10 summarizes our ability to predict mergers out of sample. As expected, the Same Match column indicates that our ability to predict mergers out of sample is worse than the in-sample fit. Specifically, the average fraction of correct predictions across years is 0.032. This fraction of correct predictions as well as the drop off in out-of-sample predictability is comparable 28 with other recent work on the ability to predict mergers in and out of sample (Cremers et al., 2009 ). In addition, the correlation of the prices from the dual of the linear programming problem with actual prices remains high (ranging from 0.625 to 0.997). That is, the model appears to predict the pattern of transfers better than the identity of the participants. Table 10 also illustrates why it is unwise to use non-equilibrium measures of fit (Highest Value and Avg. Rank) in the two-sided matching setting. Using the Highest Value fraction and Avg. Rank as our measures of fit, the out-of-sample fit appears to be on par with the in-sample fit. Nevertheless, these measures do not account for the fact that small perturbations in the payoffs can lead to large changes in the observed match. Even if the differences in match value do not reorder the preference ordering for each particular acquirer, they can change the intensity of preference, and this can change the allocation. Our equilibrium measure of fit accounts for this kind of reordering, and hence, it is more realistic about the out-of-sample validity of the model.
Counterfactual Evidence
As we saw in our bank charter specifications, an important aspect of the bank merger market is the match between type of banking regulation that applies to target and acquirer banks. Our specifications in Table 4 implied that acquirer and target banks with the same type of charter experience a premium in their match value. This premium reflects a cost of multiple types of bank charters. In this section, we report the findings from a counterfactual simulation where we impose that all banks have the same charter. Our findings suggest a sizable cost of the dual chartering system, which manifests itself in fewer mergers between banks of different chartering types. Table 11 reports the results from our counterfactual simulation. Relative to the baseline where banks may have different charters (and hence different regulatory agencies), the number of acquirer-target pairs that go unmatched declines slightly, and the total match value is significantly larger when there is no distinction between the charter types, typically a 20 to 50 percent increase in the total estimated match value of bank mergers for any given year.
Despite its large magnitude relative to banks that merge in a particular year, our estimated magnitude of 20 to 50 percent of the match value reflects a much smaller fraction of the banking industry as a whole. We observed approximately 200 mergers per year relative to a total number of banks from 7,000-10,000. 29 Rescaling our estimate by the fraction of banks that merge in a typical year in our sample, our counterfactual-estimated cost of bank chartering regulation equals 1 to 2.5 percent of the value of the entire banking industry. To put this estimate in context, 1 to 2.5 percent is slightly larger, but on the same order as the annual supervisory fee paid by national banks. For example, see calculations in Whalen (2010) , Table 1 , which report that supervisory fees for national banks average $21,000 for a bank with $25 million in assets, and $48,000 for a bank with $100 million in assets.
In percentage terms, this amounts to approximately 0.5 percent to nearly 1 percent. 29 For this calculation, take 400 merging banks from 200 mergers, and use 8000 banks as the size of the overall industry.
The implied effect reflects direct costs of additional regulation and the costs imposed by compliance with diverse chartering rules, as well as foregone opportunities when these costs stand in the way of a merger between a state bank and a national bank. Consider the example of a state acquirer bank and a national target bank with branches in multiple states. The potential merger may be advantageous due to an otherwise large overlap of markets and similarity of assets and branches, but the national bank has branches in another state. In this case, the state bank must decide whether it will learn and comply with federal charter regulations (either for the acquired branches or for the bank as a whole), or if upon acquisition of the national bank, it will divest of holdings in other states in order to bring the entire bank under the original state charter. In either case, this is a significant friction in the bank merger market.
Conclusion
In the context of bank mergers, this paper develops a novel technique that exploits the features of a matching market equilibrium to estimate merger value creation without relying on stock market information. The fact that our approach does not rely on stock market information to recover estimates of value creation is particularly advantageous, given recent work that has argued that investor re-evaluation complicates the interpretation of merger value creation estimates from announcement returns (Bhagat et al., 2005; Bayazitova et al., 2012) . In our application, we estimate that 6.02 percent of mergers in our sample were value-destroying mergers, a finding that matches closely with recent work (Bayazitova et al., 2012) . When we evaluate the determinants of merger value creation, the mergers we study appear to be motivated by branching efficiency and competitive concerns, rather than highlighting managerial agency issues or performance-motivated mergers.
Despite its simplicity, our method yields useful insight into what motivates mergers. We obtain a structural estimate of the match value function that allows us to forecast the value of potential bank mergers based on characteristics of the target and acquirer bank. In our analysis, we show how this method can be applied to determine if a proposed merger is value creating or value destroying, which makes it potentially valuable for the banks themselves, or for investors in publicly-traded banks involved in a merger or acquisition. A reliable estimate of the structural match value function also allows us to forecast which mergers will occur. In the context of our sample of bank mergers, we find that our method outperforms relevant alternatives.
Consistent with recent work by Agarwal et al. (2012) , our specifications suggest that significant implicit costs are imposed on banks through regulation. The fact that banks with national charters are subject to different regu-latory procedures than banks with state charters increases the cost of mergers between banks of different charter types. From our counterfactual exercise, we estimate that the cost of bank chartering regulation amounts to 20 to 50 percent of the value created by bank mergers in a typical year. Rescaled by the number of banks that merge in a given year, this amounts to a cost of chartering regulation of 1 to 2.5 percent of the value of the banking industry. This paper is part of an emerging literature that uses the structure of matching markets and networks in research on financial markets (Sorensen, 2007; Akkus et al., 2013; Chen and Song, 2013; Ahern and Harford, 2014) . As matching processes are ubiquitous in financial markets and endogeneity frequently confounds finance research (Roberts and Whited, 2012) , we expect techniques that leverage the structure of matching in financial markets will play an increasingly important role in finance research going forward. value function F(b,t) = β X bt + ε bt using maximum score estimation. Subsampling-based 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Point estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. Note: * * indicates significance at the five percent level, i.e., 95 percent confidence interval does not contain 0. This table presents estimates of the match value function F(b,t) = β X bt + ε bt using maximum score estimation. Subsampling-based 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Point estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. Note: * * indicates significance at the five percent level, i.e., 95 percent confidence interval does not contain 0. This table presents estimates of the match value function F(b,t) = β X bt + ε bt using maximum score estimation. Subsampling-based 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. As in Table 5 , the specifications in this table include (but do not report for the sake of brevity) own-effects and interactions for assets and branches as well as HHI Violation Fraction. Point estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. Note: * * * , * * , and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent level. Each estimate in this table is a time series mean of yearly estimates of the match value function F(b,t) = β X bt + ε bt , which were produced using maximum score estimation. The standard error of the time series mean is reported in parentheses. Note: Match value measured in millions of dollars is the sum across mergers in that year of the estimated match value for merged acquirertarget pairs. % Value Destroying is the fraction of mergers with negative merger value creation. % of Value Lost is the total (negative) merger value of these value destroying mergers divided by the overall match value. Unmatched acquirers and targets occur in the solution to the linear programming problem if mergers involving these acquirers and targets would be value destroying under the re-computed optimal configuration of mergers. Note: "Same Match" is the fraction of acquirers that are matched to the same target in the optimal pattern of mergers, "Highest Value" is the fraction of acquirers whose realized target produces the highest match value of any possible target, "Price ρ" is the correlation between the equilibrium transfers and the transfers implied by the equilibrium solution. "Highest Value" equals the fraction of matches where the observed match had the highest estimated match value for the acquirer among all counterfactual mergers, and "Avg Rank" equals the average percentile of match value for the observed match relative to all counterfactual matches. % of Optimal Value is the percentage of merger value that the observed mergers create relative to the merger value created in the solution to the linear programming problem. Note: The Revealed Preference column indicates the fraction of successful predictions using revealed preference method to estimate match value for each acquirer-target pair, and then using those estimated match values to solve for the matching market equilibrium. The Binary
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Logistic column indicates the fraction of successful predictions using the maximum fitted value from a logistic regression (with the same set of predictors as enters into the match value function) for each acquirer as the prediction of the acquirer-target match. Note: The estimated match values are obtained by running the maximum score estimator the previous year's sample of merger deals. To compute the "Same Match" fraction, compute the matching equilibrium assuming these estimated match values, and calculuate the fraction of matches that are the same as observed. Based on this matching equilibrium, "Unmatched" is the number of acquirers-targets that are not assigned to one another, and "Price ρ" is the correlation between the equilibrium transfers and the transfers implied by the equilibrium solution. As for non-equilibrium measures, "Highest Value" equals the fraction of matches where the observed match had the highest estimated match value for the acquirer among all counterfactual mergers, and "Avg Rank" equals the average percentile of match value for the observed match relative to all counterfactual matches. Because the estimated match values are computed for the year ahead, computing match value and % of optimal value makes less sense than in the in-sample case. Note: Match value is the sum across mergers in that year of the estimated match value for merged acquirer-target pairs assuming those acquirers and targets have the same bank charter. Unmatched acquirers and targets occur in the solution to the linear programming problem if mergers involving these acquirers and targets would be value destroying.
A Supporting Derivations and Alternative Specifications
This appendix presents a number of alternative specifications and assumptions to the revealed preference model we present in the main text, and contrasts the use and viability with our preferred specification.
A.1 Basic Monte Carlo Evidence on Maximum Score Estimators
Our with-transfer estimators are similar in spirit to the NTD estimator, but the addition of transfer data can significantly improve the performance of maximum score estimation. We demonstrate this advantage in two Monte Carlo experiments. 30 We employ Monte Carlo experiments rather than formal derivations because Manski (1975) 's rank order condition is not guaranteed to hold if there is an unobserved component of the match value function, even if this unobserved component is independently and identically distributed. This is not a feature unique to our setting as it is true for the NTD estimator that Fox (2010a) develops. In the case of our with-transfers-data estimators, we have another reason to present Monte Carlo exercises; namely, we do not offer an analogous rank order property that guarantees consistency for the estimators that use transfer data. 31 Nevertheless, as our Monte Carlo exercises demonstrate, the maximum score estimators -especially, the estimators that use transfer data -have a number of strengths relative to alternative techniques.
A.1.1 Data Generating Process
We simulate data on acquirer and target attributes and use a match value function with a known functional form to generate match values for each possible acquirer-target pair. Consistent with the previous section, we add an iid match-specific error to each match value. As proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1971) , we solve the social planner's problem to determine the equilibrium one-to-one matching function m (b,t):
subject to non-negativity constraints 0 ≤ m (b,t) for all b and t, and the constraint that each agent may have at most one match, ∑ t m (b,t) ≤ 1 for all b and ∑ b m (b,t) ≤ 1. for all t. The solution to this linear programming problem gives m (b,t) = 1 if acquirer b and target t are matched and m (b,t) = 0 if they are unmatched. 32 We solve the dual to this linear programming problem to obtain the equilibrium acquisition prices. For target t, the equilibrium acquisition price p t = p bt equals the shadow price on the constraint that the target t may be acquired by at most one acquirer.
With the implied matches, we form a data set that includes only matched acquirers and targets, their attributes and the acquisition prices implied by solving the dual to the social planner's problem. We solve numerically to find the global maximum of (5) for the without-transfers estimator and (6) for the with-transfers estimator. 33 30 Our findings are broadly similar to those found in Fox and Bajari (2013) , which replicated many of the results found in an earlier draft of our paper. 31 In our inequalities, the choice of acquirer b to acquire target t depends not only on the match values f (b,t) and f (b,t ), but also on both equilibrium transfer amounts p bt and p b t . Because the choice probabilities depend directly on continuous equilibrium prices in our with-transfers-data setting, it is much more difficult to write down a rank order condition that depends solely on primitives. For this reason, our argument for the desirability of our with-transfers-data estimators relies heavily on the Monte Carlo evidence.
32 Shapley and Shubik (1971) proved that we can solve the general problem, which allows for fractional matchings, without loss of generality. The optimal solution to this problem will not involve fractional matches. 33 Specifically, we employ a classical differential evolution algorithm. Differential evolution is an attractive optimization technique when the objective function is not well behaved (i.e., not differentiable and potentially having many local optima) and when the objective function is costly to compute, as it is here (Storn and Price, 1997) . For each replication in the Monte Carlo exercise, we give the differential optimization routine a parameter search space of [0, 50] for each estimated parameter.
A.1.2 Performance of Estimators on an Interactive Model
Our first Monte Carlo experiment compares the with-transfer estimators to the NTD estimator if acquirers and targets use the matching function F (b,t) = A b A t + β 1 B b B t + ε bt where the match-specific error ε bt ∼ N (0, σ ). For the Monte Carlo experiments, we set β 1 = 1.5. In this functional form, (A i , B i ) is a vector of attributes (for either target t or acquirer b) that is jointly distributed as a multivariate normal random vector . Attributes for acquirers are distributed independently of attributes for targets prior to solving for the optimal matching and equilibrium transfers. The bias and root mean squared error (RMSE) based on the 100 replications of estimator for σ ∈ {1, 5, 20} are presented in Table 12 , which confirms that the maximum score estimators that employ transfers data have much better properties than the NTD estimator that does not exploit transfers data -lower bias 34 and RMSE regardless of the amount of unobserved variability considered. When the error standard deviation is large, the without-transfers estimator has unsatisfactorily high bias and RMSE. This Monte Carlo experiment suggests that in this situation, the with-transfers estimators will have lower bias and RMSE and that we should impose the two inequalities simultaneously for better performance.
A.1.3 Performance of Estimators on a Model with a non-interacted term
Our second Monte Carlo experiment compares the with-transfer estimators to the no-transfer-data estimator if acquirers and targets use the matching function F (b,t) = β 0 A b A t + β 1 B b B t + β 2 C t + ε bt where the match-specific error ε bt ∼ N (0, σ ). For the Monte Carlo experiments, we set β 0 = 1, β 1 = 1.5 and β 2 = 2. In this functional form, (A i , B i ) is a vector of attributes with the same distribution as the first Monte Carlo experiment and C t is an attribute of the target firm that is distributed normally with a mean of 10 and a standard deviation of 1.
For each estimator and each standard deviation of the error term σ ∈ {5, 20}, we perform 100 replications. The bias and root mean squared error based on the 100 replications of NTD and WT1 are presented in Table 13 . 35 In addition to estimating the model with the non-interacted term using the with-transfers estimators, we produce estimates from a mis-specified model using the NTD estimator. We do this because, for this matching function, the inequalities for the NTD estimator given in equation (4) do not allow us to identify β 2 because adding equations (2) and (3) together trivially differences out the β 2 C t term. 36 As in the first Monte Carlo experiment, the with-transfers estimator is more precise than the without-transfers estimator. In this case, the maximum score estimator produces estimates tightly clustered around the true parameter values for all three coefficients, exhibiting low median bias in both the low variance and high variance cases. Moreover, the estimator appears to be well-identified. 37 In addition to added precision, the Table 13 results indicate that the with-transfers estimator is able to identify parameters on non-interacted terms (in this case, β 2 ) whereas 34 The differential evolution optimization technique always obtains a solution, even if the parameter vector is unidentified. In the unidentified case, the parameter estimate is a random draw from the parameter search space. In our Monte Carlo exercise, we allow the algorithm to search over [0, 50] while the true parameter value is 1.5. As a result, unidentified parameters in our technique tend to return values near 25, the middle of the parameter search interval, which results in bias in the Monte Carlo exercise. In practice, unidentified parameters will also exhibit bias because (almost surely) the researcher-chosen parameter space will not be centered on the true parameter value. 35 In unreported specifications, we also performed this Monte Carlo exercise for the WT2 estimator. Similar to the first Monte Carlo exercise, WT2 had worse properties than WT1. Thus, for brevity, we omit the WT2 results from Table 13 . 36 In unreported Monte Carlo exercises, we ran the NTD estimator in an attempt to recover the unidentified β 2 parameter. In this unidentified case, the optimization routine will randomly select a number from the parameter space. This process has expected value 25. Thus, in a Monte Carlo exercise where a parameter is unidentified, both bias toward 25 and high RMSE confirm the parameter being unidentified. In other unreported Monte Carlo exercises, we ran a version of our with-transfers estimators where β 0 was restricted to be 1, which facilitated a direct comparison between the NTD and the with-transfers estimator. These results are available upon request.
37 This is especially true in the low variance case. In the high variance case, the estimator to go awry for several runs of the Monte Carlo exercise, inflating the bias and RMSE. With skewed outcomes like this, the median bias results are a more reliable estimate of typical performance.
the without-transfers estimator is unidentified in this case.
A.2 Monte Carlo Evidence for Alternative Estimators
In addition to comparing our with-transfer data estimator to Fox (2010a)'s no-transfer-data estimator, we compare our preferred method to two additional alternative estimation techniques: multinomial logit estimation of the matching market, and maximum score estimation in a one-sided matching market.
A.2.1 Multinomial Logit
To estimate the match value function using a multinomial logit, we must assume the error term ε bt is distributed iid Type 1 Extreme Value (T1EV). Both assumptions about ε bt -the T1EV distributional assumption and the assumption of independence across acquirer-target pairs -are restrictive. Nevertheless, the multinomial logit model is widely understood and applied in other contexts, and thus, it serves as a useful baseline for our maximum score estimator. For this reason, we compare our with-transfers matching estimator to the multinomial logit using the first Monte Carlo experiment from Section A.1. Table 14 (a) presents the results from 100 replications of the multinomial logit alongside the comparable results from the with-transfers estimator. In all cases (σ = {1, 5, 20}), the maximum score estimator exhibits similar bias and lower RMSE. These results confirm that the maximum score approach, which accounts for endogeneity by explicitly modeling the matching market, performs better than the standard multinomial logit.
A.2.2 One-sided Matching
Our maximum score estimators assume that acquirers and targets are two distinct groups to obtain the set of estimating inequalities for maximum score estimation, but this assumption is unrealistic as well. In a real world merger market, an acquirer could become a target if equilibrium transfers change. Using revealed preference and the fact that each target can become an acquirer and each acquirer can become a target, we derive two additional inequalities for each comparison of an observed match to a counterfactual match. 38
These inequalities can be combined with the inequalities in equations (2) and (3) to form the basis of another maximum score estimator. This estimator, the one-sided matching maximum score estimator, maximizes the objective function:
In Table 14 (b), we present results from a Monte Carlo experiment where the underlying matching market is based on one-sided matching with the same match value function as the first Monte Carlo experiment. In this case, the maximum score estimator based on two-sided matching (maximizing (6)) performs as well the estimator based on one-sided matching (maximizing (10)). In fact, the two-sided matching estimator performs slightly better. These Monte Carlo results suggest that the primary benefit of the maximum score estimator comes from using data on transfers in the matching market (inequalities (2) and (3)), and that the distinction between one-sided and two-sided does not improve precision of the estimator.
A.2.3 Empirically Assessing Without-Transfers and One-sided Matching Estimators Table 15 demonstrates how the without-transfers estimator compares with the with-transfers estimator. As the without-transfers estimator cannot identify the scale of the match value function, we normalize the coefficient on the assets interaction to be one. In contrast, the with-transfers estimator imposes the scale of the transfer amount on the match value function, and as a result, the estimates from with-transfers estimation are not directly comparable to the without-transfer estimator. Aside from the coefficient estimate on the branches estimation when we control for MSA overlap and HHI violation, the sign pattern is the same across the two estimators.
The fact that the with-transfers estimator is on a naturally interpretable scale is a significant advantage to using transfer data. Additionally, the with-transfers estimator can identify non-interactive terms, which allows us to analyze a wider array of matching functions. For example, we may want to control for the size of the target banking institution. Our estimator with transfer data allows us to include target-specific controls while the withouttransfers estimator does not. For this reason, we focus the remainder of the paper on results from the more precise and interpretable with-transfers estimator.
We also run the basic multiplicative specifications using the maximum score estimator based on one-sided matching discussed in Section A.2.2. 39 Table 16 presents these results, which are qualitatively similar to the results we find using the assumption that the merger market is two-sided (see Tables 2, 3 and 4 in the main text). Namely, the results suggest that the interaction between acquirer and target assets and the interaction between acquirer and target branches are robust features of the match value function, but in a horse race between the two (column 3), the asset interaction is more important. The finding that the asset interaction is more robust is also a feature of the less-computationally-demanding two-sided matching technique.
The fact that the one-sided matching assumption does not lead to important differences in the estimation results suggests that the assumption that there are two distinct groups on either side of the market is not violated in a way that perversely affects the results. For this reason and because the two-sided maximum score estimator is appreciably easier to implement, our main specifications rely on the two-sided with transfers estimator.
A.3 Alternative Specifications for the Match Value Function
The multiplicative specification for the match value function in the main text follows much of the literature on matching markets in that we consider interactions between attributes of each side of the market as components of the match value function. Here, we also consider two alternatives to the match value function discussed in the main text: (1) a quadratic loss match value function, and (2) a cross-attribute interactive match value function.
A match value function with a quadratic functional form penalizes differences between acquirer and target attributes:
This quadratic functional form allows the researcher to estimate the degree to which acquirer banks place a premium on similarity. For β 1 < 0, the match value function implies a penalty to match value to merging with a bank on the other side of the market that is too different. In the context of bank mergers, it is difficult to rationalize similarity in the number of branches or the amount of assets as a motive for merging. Hence, we focus our discussion of the empirical results on the multiplicative specification in equations (8). 40 As the large-banking-network motivation to merge suggests, interactions between target and acquirer bank attributes can be important. As an alternative to the specification in the main text, an acquirer bank with an abnormally large amount of assets relative to branches may demand having more branch locations to service the customers who hold those assets. Thus, such an acquirer would derive considerably more value from target banks with a large number of branches. For this reason, we also estimate a matching function that interacts target and acquirer attributes across attributes (i.e., target assets with acquirer branches). To consider these interactive effects, we also estimate the cross-attribute specification:
Table 17 reports the maximum score estimates from the cross-attribute specifications in equation (12). In particular, these specifications allow the match value to depend on the interaction between acquirer branches and target assets, rather than the same-attribute interactions reported in Tables 2 through 4 . Cross-interaction terms allow us to investigate the extent to which mergers are motivated by the match of acquirer branches to target assets, or the match between acquirer assets and target branches. If the number of branches represents the lending infrastructure of the bank and bank assets are loanable funds, the match between branches at one institution and assets at another could play an important role in determining merger value.
Based on the estimates in Table 17 , the interaction between acquirer branches and target assets enters positively and significantly into the match value function, and matters more to the match value than the interaction between target branches and acquirer assets. Given the context, this finding suggests that bank mergers in our sample were motivated by acquirers with excess lending opportunities who seek targets with excess loanable funds. 40 In unreported specifications, we estimate this quadratic match value function, and find that the penalty term for assets is negative and statistically significant. In the context of our findings, this result derives from the fact that there is a positive relationship between acquirer and target assets and branches in the bank merger market equilibrium. It is possible that these specifications pick up on the similarity of banks in terms of number of business lines, but more similar to the tradition established in previous work in empirical matching, we find it more plausible that the underlying mechanism driving bank merger value is a multiplicative interaction between acquirer and target banking networks rather than matching on similarity of attributes. Note: The estimates in this table were produced by maximizing the objective function (5) for NTD, (6) for with-transfers (WT1) and (7) for with-transfers (WT2) using R's differential evolution routine (package: DEoptim by Mullen et al., 2011) . In the differential evolution method, we set the number of population members to be 50, the scaling factor to be 0.5, the optimization window for the parameter space Note: In the without-transfers panel, (n) indicates that the coefficient was normalized for identification purposes, while (ni) indicates that the coefficient is not theoretically identified. The estimates in this table were produced by maximizing the objective function (5) for NTD, for with-transfers (WT1) using R's differential evolution routine (Mullen et al., 2011) . In the differential evolution method, we set the number of population members to be 50, the scaling factor to be 0.5, the optimization window for the parameter space Note: The multinomial logit estimates were produced using maximum likelihood estimation (R's maxLik package). The estimates for onesided matching were produced by maximizing the objective function (10), and the two-sided with-transfers estimates in this table were produced by maximizing (6) using R's differential evolution routine (package: DEoptim by Mullen et al., 2011) . For both methods, the scale is normalized by setting the coefficient on the interaction term A b A t to be 1. In the differential evolution method, we set the number of population members to be 50, the scaling factor to be 0.5, the optimization window for the parameter space (1) and (2) use the without-transfers maximum score estimator while Columns (3) and (4) are the corresponding specifications using our with-transfers maximum score estimator. 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Point estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. Note: 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. Point estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. estimates are generated by running the differential evolution optimization routine using R's DEoptim package (Mullen et al. 2011) For differential evolution, we use 100 population members, scaling parameter 0.5 and we employ the classical differential evolution strategy (strategy =1). For point estimates, we run the optimization routine for 20 different starting points (seeds) and select the run that achieves the largest value of the objective function. For confidence intervals, we use the subsampling procedure described in Politis and Romano (1992) . We set the subsample size to be 500 (approximately 1/3 to 1/4 the total sample size) and randomly generate 100 replications of the routine to obtain confidence bounds. 
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